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WARNING! SPEAK AT YOUR OWN RISK: FIRST AMENDMENT 
RESTRICTIONS ON OFF-CAMPUS PHYSICAL, EMOTIONAL, OR 
CYBER BULLYING 
Melissa Anne Springer* 
“Once a government is committed to the principle of silencing 
the voice of opposition, it has only one way to go, and that is down 
the path of increasingly repressive measures, until it becomes a 
source of terror to all its citizens and creates a country where 
everyone lives in fear.” 
- Harry Truman, Special Message to the Congress on the Internal 
Security of the United States, August 8, 1950 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
You are upset and frustrated after a student called you a string of 
rude, offensive names. Your parents always told you that “sticks and 
stones may break my bones, but names will never hurt me,” and you are 
not hurt; you are devastated. To feel better, you create a new blog 
website—Bullies Who Bully—and begin typing your first post, pouring 
every graphic detail of today’s events into the computer without naming 
names. After a few minutes, you post it. 
The next morning, you wake feeling terrible again; you relived the 
horrible ordeal all over again in a dream. Hoping to feel better, you open 
your blog to re-read your post from last night, and, to your surprise, the 
post has twenty comments, a few of which recount similar ordeals! You 
read through the comments and realize that they are all from other 
students at your school: the descriptions of the school hallways, the 
other students, and even the school mascot are vividly described. 
Inspired, you open the blog so others can post their own stories. 
Over the next few months, the number of blog posts skyrockets, each 
one vividly and anonymously describing and tormenting at least one 
student from your school. Some posts even include drawings that depict 
the events either described in that specific post or in relation to another 
post on the blog. You created an outlet for students to rant and blow off 
steam; however, not everyone sees it that way.  
The next morning, the principal calls you into office and shows you 
page after page of the posts from your blog, including the very first one 
that you composed. You are horrified. The principal explains to you that 
the student that you described—initials B.W.B.—told his parents, who 
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in turn told the principal. An investigation into the blog and your 
conduct follows and, eventually, you are suspended for the content that 
you posted on the blog. You and your parents hire an attorney. The 
attorney then files a lawsuit against the school district, alleging a 
violation of the First Amendment Free Speech rights because you were 
suspended for what you posted on the blog. Furthermore, your attorney 
explains that this never should have happened because your conduct 
occurred off of school property and was not during a school-sanctioned 
activity. 
Although the history of case law regarding the freedom of speech has 
primarily pertained to school speech on campus, “the way students 
communicate both inside and outside the school has changed 
dramatically.”1 As a result, a wave of recent cases pushed the 
boundaries of free speech, wherein numerous circuit courts analyzed 
whether schools could restrict students’ freedom of speech relating to 
off-campus speech.2 With an increased usage of technology in the home 
and in the classroom, the courts must now consider how the freedom of 
speech is affected not only in the physical context—e.g., talking to 
another person or a physical banner—but also in electronic 
interactions—e.g., posting inappropriate photos of another student 
online, sexting, cyber bullying, etc. 
The main issue in contention between the circuit courts is whether the 
First Amendment protects off-campus speech that is perceived as 
harassing or intimidating, via either violent or sexual suggestions. In 
determining whether the speech is protected, the circuit courts chose to 
apply different tests: the Nexus test, the reasonably foreseeable test, or a 
fusion of the two. Thus, the main question boils down to what test 
should be applied when a court considers whether off-campus speech is 
protected under the First Amendment, especially when that off-campus 
speech is perceived as harassing or intimidating. 
Before delving into a discussion as to what test or tests should apply, 
this article briefly reviews the history and evolution of applying Free 
Speech in schools. Next, this article discusses the circuit court decisions 
that created the circuit split. After the circuit split analysis, this article 
argues that the Supreme Court should create a new test specifically for 
off-campus speech. This article then analyzes how a possible restriction 
of off-campus speech intersects with the parental right to raise children, 
followed by a consideration of how this affects children, students, and 
individuals in general, as well as the effects of free-speech-suspension 
 
 1. Jessica K. Boyd, Moving the Bully from the Schoolyard to Cyberspace: How Much 
Protection is Off-Campus Student Speech Awarded under the First Amendment? 64 ALA. L. REV. 1215, 
1215 (2013). 
 2. Infra, notes 14, 15, 16, 17. 
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on the youth. In conclusion, this article suggests that a reasonably 
foreseeable test should be applied to off-campus speech, specifically for 
the adolescent youth. 
II.  HISTORY OF FREE SPEECH: A DISCUSSION OF THE APPLICABLE TESTS 
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”3 
While not everyone can recite the entirety of the First Amendment, most 
can probably list the general freedoms it grants them: freedom of 
religion, freedom of speech, and peaceful assembly.4 However, to what 
extent is our freedom of speech a protected constitutional guarantee? 
Generally, students have a broad freedom of speech in schools: 
 
Students in the public schools do not shed their constitutional 
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.  
They cannot be punished merely for expressing their personal 
views on the school premises—whether in the cafeteria, or on the 
playing field, or on the campus during the authorized hours . . . .5 
 
However, this freedom is not absolute. When reviewing alleged 
constitutional violations of a student’s freedom of speech, the Supreme 
Court has historically looked to speech inside the schoolhouse gates. 
Specifically, the Court created exceptions for speech in special contexts 
or restricted environments where ordinary speech-protected rules were 
either not applied or were applied in a materially different, and often 
greatly diminished, fashion. However, the freedom of speech may not be 
restricted unless school “authorities [have] reason to anticipate that 
[such expression will] substantially interfere with the work of the school 
or impinge upon the rights of other students.”6 
For example, in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 
the Supreme Court held that school children were not required to 
participate in a salute to the flag or to say the pledge of allegiance 
because such compulsion “transcend[ed] constitutional limitations on 
[local authorities’] power and invad[ed] the sphere of intellect and spirit 
which it is the purpose of the First Amendment . . . to reserve from all 
official control.”7 In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community 
 
 3. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 4. “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably 
to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” Id. 
 5. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (quoting Tinker v. Des 
Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)) (internal quotations omitted).  
 6. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509. 
 7. 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).  
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School District, the Court held that the students had a First Amendment 
right to wear black arm bands in school as a protest against the Vietnam 
War because there were no facts on record that would reasonably have 
led school officials to foresee a “substantial disruption of or material 
interference with school activities.”8 
In contrast, the Supreme Court, in Bethel School District v. Fraser, 
held that the First Amendment did not prevent a school district from 
disciplining high school students who gave a lewd speech at high school 
assembly because “[t]he First Amendment does not prevent the school 
officials from determining that to permit vulgar and lewd speech such as 
[the student’s] would undermine the school’s basic educational 
mission.”9 Similarly, in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, the 
Court held that the First Amendment did not prevent school officials 
from “exercising editorial control over the style and content of student 
speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions 
[were] reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”10 
In addition, schools may be able to restrict speech that occurs outside 
the schoolhouse gates if the speech occurs (1) during normal school 
hours, and (2) during a school-sanctioned event.11 If this is the case, then 
the school’s rules of student conduct expressly apply; the student may 
be restricted from making certain comments; and the school will not 
violate that student’s constitutional right to free speech.12 Specifically, 
the Supreme Court held, in Morse v. Frederick, that “[b]ecause schools 
may take steps to safeguard those entrusted to their care from speech 
that can reasonably be regarded as encouraging illegal drug use, the 
school officials . . . did not violate the First Amendment by confiscating 
the pro-drug banner and suspending [the student].”13 
But what happens when a student speaks off campus and is not 
attending a school-sanctioned or school-sponsored event or is not part of 
the school’s mission to safeguard students from pro-drug paraphernalia? 
Although the general rule might be that the school cannot restrict this 
type of off-campus speech, numerous circuit courts have held that 
schools may restrict certain off-campus speech. 
 
 8. 393 U.S. at 514. 
 9. 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986).  
 10. 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988). 
 11. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, at Syllabus (2007) (permitting schools to restrict student 
speech that occurs outside the school if the speech occurred during normal school hours and occurred 
during a school-sanctioned event as an approved social event). 
 12. Id.  
 13. Id. 
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III.  MODERN CASES WHERE STUDENT SPEECH DID NOT OCCUR ON 
SCHOOL PROPERTY 
Circuit courts have recently decided cases arising under the First 
Amendment—alleging violations of students’ freedom of speech—in 
four different ways: some courts adopt the Nexus test;14 other courts 
adopt the reasonably foreseeable test;15 some initiate their own tests;16 
and still others refuse to pick and instead apply both.17 
A.  The Fourth Circuit’s Application of the Nexus Test 
In Kowalski v. Berkely County Sch., a high school suspended a senior 
student for creating and posting to a social media page on MySpace, 
“which was largely dedicated to ridiculing a fellow student.”18 The title 
of the webpage read: “No No Herpes, We don’t want no herpes” and, 
although the student alleged that that acronym “S.A.S.H.” stood for 
“Students Against Sluts Herpes,” a classmate claimed “S.A.S.H” really 
stood for “Students Against Shay’s Herpes,” a fellow student at the high 
school who was also the main topic of discussion on the webpage.19 
After creating the page and inviting others to join, about twenty-four 
students from the same high school posted and responded to texts, 
comments, and photos on the webpage.20 Of the posts, certain photos 
had red dots drawn on a student’s “face to simulate herpes and added a 
sign near her pelvic region, that read, ‘Warning: Enter at your own risk”; 
another post included a photo of the same student’s “face with a sign 
that read, ‘portrait of a whore.’”21 Once the webpage was brought to the 
high school administration’s attention, it quickly determined that the 
student had created a “hate website,” and suspended the student for 
violating “the school policy against ‘harassment, bullying, and 
intimidation.’”22  
In her complaint, the student alleged that she was unconstitutionally 
expelled for five days and that the school “was not justified in regulating 
her speech because it did not occur during a ‘school-related activity,’ but 
rather was ‘private out-of-school speech.’”23 However, the district court 
 
 14. See generally Kowalski v. Berkely Cnty Sch., 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 15. See generally S.J.W. v. Lee’s Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 771 (8th Cir. 2012). 
 16. See generally Bell v. Itawamba Cnty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 17. See generally C.R. v. Eugene Sch. Dist. 4J, 835 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 18. 652 F.3d at 567.  
 19. Id.  
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 568. 
 22. Id. at 568-569 (internal quotations omitted). 
 23. Id.  at 567. 
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granted summary judgment for the school “because [the student’s] 
webpage was created for the purpose of inviting others to indulge in 
disruptive and hateful conduct, which caused an in-school disruption.” 24 
Justifying its conclusion, the district court stated “(1) that [the student] 
was on notice that she could be punished for her off-campus behavior 
[because she “had received a Student Handbook which included the 
School District's Harassment, Bullying, and Intimidation Policy, as well 
as the Student Code of Conduct”] and (2) that she was provided with an 
opportunity to be heard prior to her suspension.”25 
On appeal, the student argued that the school violated her First 
Amendment Free Speech rights because her speech involved “off-
campus, non-school related speech.”26 However, the Fourth Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s decision that the school’s actions and 
sanctions imposed on the student were permissible: 
 
[T]he School District was authorized . . . to discipline [the student], 
regardless of where her speech originated, because . . . [the 
student] used the internet to orchestrate a targeted attack on a 
classmate, and did so in a manner that was sufficiently connected 
to the school environment as to implicate the School District’s 
recognized authority to discipline speech which “materially and 
substantially interfere[es] with the requirements of appropriate 
discipline in the operation of the school and collid[es] with the 
rights of others.”27 
 
Thus, even though a student’s speech may occur off-campus, such 
speech may be restricted by the school if, “[g]iven the targeted, 
defamatory nature of the [student’s] speech, aimed at a fellow classmate, 
it created ‘actual or nascent’ substantial disorder and disruption in the 
school.”28 Finally, when a student “fails to see that such harassment and 
bullying is inappropriate and hurtful[,] . . . it must be taken seriously by 
school administrators in order to preserve the appropriate pedagogical 
environment.”29 As such, “where such speech has a sufficient nexus 
with the school [regardless of whether it is on-campus or off-campus], 
the Constitution is not written to hinder school administrators’ good 
 
 24. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 25. Id. at 569-570. 
 26. Id. at 570. 
 27. Id. at 574. 567 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 
513 (1969)). 
 28. Id. at 574 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508). 
 29. Id. at 577. 
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faith efforts to address the problem.”30 
B.  The Eighth Circuit Application of the “Reasonably Foreseeable” 
Test 
In S.J.W. v. Lee’s Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., twin brothers were 
suspended for 180 days after they created a blog intended “to discuss, 
satirize, and ‘vent’” about events at their high school.31 Although the 
website used an international domain site that prevented users in the 
United States from finding the website via a general search, anyone 
could access the website if they knew the web address.32 A few of their 
“posts contained a variety of offensive and racist comments as well as 
sexually explicit and degrading comments about particular female 
classmates, whom they identified by name.”33 Although non-school 
computers were used for the majority of the events surrounding the 
website, one of the students “used a school computer to upload files 
needed to create [the website].”34 The twin brothers were suspended 
from school for 180 days after the school administrators discovered the 
website and its contents.35 
Even though the district court noted that the website “caused 
considerable disturbance and disruption,” it also determined that the 
students’ inability to participate in extracurricular activities or attend 
honor classes “constituted irreparable harm.”36 Thus, the district court 
granted the students’ motion for preliminary injunction and allowed 
them to return to the school; however, on appeal, the Eighth Circuit 
reversed the preliminary injunction because, among other reasons, the 
plaintiffs “[were] unlikely to succeed on the merits.”37 
Regarding the plaintiffs’ likely success on the merits, the Eighth 
Circuit analyzed the protection of off-campus speech under Tinker,38 
stating it was unlikely the plaintiffs would succeed on the merits 
because the plaintiff’s website “posts caused a substantial disruption.”39 
“Thus, student speech that causes a substantial disruption is not 
protected.”40 
 
 30. Id. 
 31. 696 F.3d 771, 773 (8th Cir. 2012). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 774. 
 36. Id. at 775.  
 37. Id. at 775-776. 
 38. Id. at 777. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 777. 
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C.  The Fifth Circuit Application of the “Reasonably Foreseeable” Test 
In Bell v. Itawamba Cnty. Sch. Dist., the Fifth Circuit held that 
summary judgment was appropriate for a lawsuit pertaining to a high-
school student’s rap song, recorded off-campus with the use of school 
equipment and posted on social media, when (1) the song described 
“threatening, harassing, and intimidating language” towards two 
coaches;41 and (2) the student intended for the song to be heard by the 
school community.42 
First, the Fifth Circuit established “the extent to which off-campus 
student speech may be restricted without offending the First 
Amendment.”43 Via a brief discussion by the court, “Tinker applies to 
off-campus speech in certain situations.”44 Furthermore, Tinker applies 
as a particular response to “the paramount need for school officials to be 
able to react quickly and efficiently to protect students and faculty from 
threats, intimidation, and harassment intentionally directed at the school 
community.”45 
Second, the Fifth Circuit delved into answering the question, “under 
what circumstances may off-campus speech be restricted.”46 As 
previously noted by the court, “over 45 years ago, . . . the Internet, 
cellphones, smartphones, and digital social media did not exist. The 
advent of these technologies and their sweeping adoption by students 
present new and evolving challenges for school administrators, 
confounding previously delineated boundaries of permissible 
regulations.”47 Thus, “schools can be places of special danger,” 
especially with the increased use of technology.48 Acknowledging that 
threatening, intimidating, and harassing language creates “tension 
between a student’s free-speech rights and a school official’s duty to 
maintain discipline and protect the school community,”49 the court 
concluded: 
 
The pervasive and omnipresent nature of the Internet has 
obfuscated the on-campus/off-campus distinction advocated by 
[the plaintiff], “mak[ing] any effort to trace First 
 
 41. 799 F.3d 379, 384-385 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 42. Id. at 383 (the plaintiff posted the recording “on the Internet (first on his publicly accessible 
Facebook profile page and then on YouTube), intending it to reach the school community.”). 
 43. Id. at 393. 
 44. Id. at 394. 
 45. Id. at 393. 
 46. Id. at 394. 
 47. Id. at 392.  
 48. Id.  
 49. Id.  
8
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 11
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol86/iss2/11
2018]FIRST AMENDMENT RESTRICTIONS ON OFF-CAMPUS BULLYING 857 
Amendment boundaries along the physical boundaries of a school 
campus a recipe for serious problems in our public schools.” 
Accordingly, in the light of our court's precedent, we hold 
Tinker governs our analysis, as in this instance, when a student 
intentionally directs at the school community speech reasonably 
understood by school officials to threaten, harass, and intimidate a 
teacher, even when such speech originated, and was disseminated, 
off-campus without the use of school resources.50 
 
Thus, the school officials acted reasonably, and summary judgment 
was appropriate because “the school board reasonably could have 
forecast a substantial disruption at school, based on the threatening, 
intimidating, and harassing language” in the song.51 
D.  The Ninth Circuit Application of Both the Nexus Test and the 
“Reasonably Foreseeable” Test 
In C.R. v. Eugene Sch. Dist. 4J,52 the Ninth Circuit did not join either 
side of the current circuit split but instead paved its own course, holding 
that both tests apply. In making its decision, the court reviewed the 
pertinent facts: over several days, the defendant along with a few other 
seventh-grade boys followed and teased two sixth-grade students on 
their way home from school.53 Both of the sixth-grade students were 
disabled, and the “teasing” occurred as the students traveled along the 
same route from the school to their homes, including along an area the 
school administrators called “the back field.”54 Eventually, the “teasing” 
escalated: the defendant, accompanied by the other seventh graders, 
gave the six-graders vulgar nicknames, and made sexual jokes, a series 
of which referred to oral sex.55 When the school was informed and after 
an internal investigation, wherein all the alleged participants and victims 
were interviewed, all the participants were disciplined; the defendant 
received a two-day, out-of-school suspension.56 The defendant’s parents 
 
 50. Id. at 395-396. (quoting Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 220-221 (3rd Cir. 
2011) (Jordan, J., concurring)). 
 51. Id. at 400. 
 52. 835 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 53. Id. at 1146. 
 54. Id. (internal quotations omitted). Each child involved took the same route home from school: 
“a bike path leading from the school, across a public park, to a neighboring street. The park borders the 
school’s athletic fields, but there is no visible boundary to indicate where school property ends and the 
park begins. On the far side of the park, across from the school, is a track belonging to the School 
District. The school’s administrators casually refer to the park, track, and fields collectively as ‘the back 
field.’” Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 1145-1147. 
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sued the school district, alleging violations of the defendant’s First 
Amendment and due process rights.57 
Affirming the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment for 
the school district, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the defendant’s 
suspension by the school district was permissible,58 and it also noted: 
 
To determine whether a school properly disciplined a student for 
off-campus speech requires us to answer two questions: First, we 
consider the threshold question of whether the school could 
permissibly regulate the student’s off-campus speech at all. Next, 
we consider the question of whether the school’s regulation of the 
student’s speech complied with the First 
Amendment’s requirements. 59 
 
Thus, the Ninth Circuit analyzed to what extent a school may regulate 
and restrict student speech, and then whether the school district had the 
authority to restrict the defendant’s off-campus speech.60 
The Ninth Circuit first recognized that there are four types of student 
speech that schools may regulate and restrict: “(1) vulgar, lewd, 
obscene, and plainly offensive speech”61; “(2) school-sponsored 
speech”62; “(3) speech promoting illegal drug use”63; and “(4) speech 
that falls into [none] of these categories . . . .”64 However, the Ninth 
Circuit acknowledged that these four types of speech pertained to on-
campus speech, and the Supreme Court had yet to answer how courts 
should treat off-campus speech.65 
The Ninth Circuit continued by distinguishing the facts at hand from 
those of other circuits: “the vast majority of law in this area concerns 
school officials’ authority to discipline students for internet speech. In 
this case, nothing was put into writing, and the students’ speech was 
never shared online.”66 To determine whether off-campus student speech 
could be restricted, the court looked to both the Nexus test and the 
“reasonably foreseeable” test. Under the Nexus test, the Ninth Circuit 
 
 57. Id. at 1147. 
 58. Id. at 1148. 
 59. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 60. Id. at 1148-1152. 
 61. Id. at 1148 (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986)). 
 62. Id. (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 n. 4 (1988)) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
 63. Id. (quoting Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396 (2007)) (internal quotations omitted). 
 64. Id. at 1149 (quoting Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2013)) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 1150. 
10
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determined, “[a]lthough the harassment at issue in this case took place 
off school property, it was closely tied to the school.”67 Thus, the court 
held that it was “a reasonable exercise of the School District’s in loco 
parentis authority to be concerned with its students’ well being as they 
beg[a]n their homeward journey at the end of the school day.”68 
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit determined that the “reasonably 
foreseeable” test applied: “[b]ecause the harassment happened in such 
close proximity to the school, administrators could reasonably expect 
the harassment’s effects to spill over into the school environment” and 
“[a]administrators could also reasonably expect students to discuss the 
harassment at school.”69 
Thus, the Ninth Circuit applied both the Nexus and “reasonably 
foreseeable” tests mentioned in Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist.,70 
concluding “that under either test, the School District had the authority 
to discipline [the defendant] for his off-campus speech.”71 
E.  LaVine & Wynar: Additional Ninth Circuit Cases Dealing with First 
Amendment Restrictions on Off-Campus Speech 
In LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., a student wrote poem from the 
perspective of the school shooter.72 A few months later, the student 
found the long-forgotten poem and brought it into school for his 
teacher’s feedback.73 Disturbed by the poem’s content, the teacher 
brought it to the attention of the school’s administration, who decided to 
“emergency expel” the student out of extreme caution.74 In a suit 
brought by the student, alleging a First Amendment violation, the Ninth 
Circuit held that the student’s expulsion was not a violation of his First 
Amendment rights because of its violent content.75 The Ninth Circuit 
did not discuss how the poem’s creation off-campus played into their 
decision; however, off-campus origins was later considered and 
discussed by the Ninth Circuit in 2013: “the location of the speech can 
 
 67. Id.  
 68. Id. at 1151. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2013) is discussed later in 
this article. 
 71. Eugene, 835 F.3d at 1150. The court continued, stating “Our decision is necessarily restricted 
to the unique facts presented by this case: The speech at issue occurred exclusively between students, in 
close temporal and physical proximity to the school, on property that is not obviously demarcated from 
the campus itself. A school may act to ensure students are able to leave the school safely without 
implicating the rights of students to speak freely in the broader community.” Id. at 1152. 
 72. 257 F.3d 981, 983-984 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 73. Id. at 984. 
 74. Id. at 984-985 (internal quotations omitted). 
 75. Id. at 990. 
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make a difference . . . not . . . all off-campus speech is beyond the reach 
of school officials.”76 
In Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., a student sent a series of 
messages to friends via social media, threatening to commit a school 
shooting.77 Even though the messages were composed and sent from the 
student’s home computer, the Ninth Circuit held that the school did not 
violate the student’s First Amendment rights by suspending him 
because, “when faced with an identifiable threat of school violence, 
schools may take disciplinary action in response to off-campus 
speech.”78 Thus, the Ninth Circuit declined to choose between the 
Fourth Circuit’s application of the Nexus test and the Eighth Circuit’s 
application of the “reasonably foreseeable” test.79 Instead, the court 
decided both were satisfied when a student threatens a school shooting.80 
IV.  ARGUMENT 
Due to the current circuit court split, the main question is whether the 
First Amendment protects off-campus speech that is perceived as 
harassing or intimidating, via either violent or sexual suggestions. As 
demonstrated, the circuits that have already heard and decided this issue 
have applied the Nexus test, the “reasonably foreseeable” test, or both. 
As the Ninth Circuit mentioned in Eugene, there are four general tests 
applicable to on-campus speech: “(1) vulgar, lewd, obscene, and plainly 
offensive speech”81; “(2) school-sponsored speech”82; “(3) ‘speech 
promoting illegal drug use’”83; and “(4) speech that falls into [none] of 
these categories . . . .”84 At the very least, any court going forward 
should consider whether a school district’s restriction on a student’s off-
campus speech is a violation of the student’s First Amendment rights 
under Tinker. However, this should not become the court’s sole tool in 
its analysis; the courts should also consider the student’s intent for the 
speech when applying the First Amendment tests. Furthermore, courts 
could draw a symbolic line in the sand between off-campus and on-
 
 76. Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1068 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 77. Id. at 1065. 
 78. Id. at 1069. 
 79. See id.  
 80. Id. 
 81. Eugene, 835 F.3d at 1148 (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 n. 
4 (1988)) (internal quotations omitted). 
 82. Id. (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 n. 4 (1988)) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
 83. Id. (quoting Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396 (2007)) (internal quotations omitted). 
 84. Id. at 1149 (quoting Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2013)) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
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campus speech, “having no authority to regulate any speech or 
expression that does not occur on school grounds or at a school-
sanctioned event.”85 Nonetheless, this solution is too extreme because 
“speech uttered exclusively outside of the confines of the school could 
still disrupt the school in its task of educating children as much as 
speech spoken in the classroom.”86 Thus, it will behoove courts, 
including the Supreme Court, to create a different, albeit similar, test to 
help navigate the crossroads of off-campus speech and First Amendment 
Free Speech as technology becomes increasingly more prevalent in 
everyday life. 
A.  The Supreme Court Should Create a New Off-Campus Speech Test 
Aside from Morse, the Supreme Court developed all of the free 
speech tests almost 30 years ago, during a time when computers were 
not in every household and when smartphones, tablets, the Internet, etc. 
were non-existent.87 In response to the rise of technology and the 
plethora of violence therefrom, the circuit courts attempted to apply the 
current Free Speech tests; however, this application—specifically the 
Nexus and “reasonably foreseeable” tests—may give the school districts 
too much leniency in determining when a student crosses the line into 
unprotected speech. Therefore, the Supreme Court should create a new 
test wherein the multiple elements considering whether a student’s 
speech is or is not protected are balanced against each other. Generally, 
“[s]chools must tolerate students’ unpopular religious and political 
opinions within the school and at school-sanctioned activities”; 
however, “students’ rights in the school context are not automatically 
‘coextensive’ within the rights of adults in a public setting.”88 Thus, the 
courts must balance the priorities of both the students and the school 
district.89 
Element 1. What is the Student’s Intent Behind the Off-Campus 
Speech? 
As demonstrated in the circuit court cases above, “on-campus and off-
campus distinction is becoming increasingly difficult with the 
 
 85. Boyd, supra note 1 at 1232. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 1217. 
 88. Id. at 1231. 
 89. Id. at 1231-1232 (“A students’ right to freely express his political and religious beliefs inside 
the school has to be weighed against the school’s task of ensuring its students learn ‘socially appropriate 
behavior’ in order to function in our society.”) (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 
675,  681 (1986)). 
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instantaneous nature of the Internet.”90 Therefore, almost any 
communication can “foreseeably make its way to a school campus,”91 
creating an insurmountable difficulty for school officials and the courts. 
By looking to the student’s intent behind the off-campus speech, school 
officials can determine whether it “has sufficient basis for jurisdiction” 
and can, therefore, restrict the student’s speech.92 Furthermore, the intent 
behind the student’s speech could, theoretically, “protect more students 
from schools overstepping their jurisdictional bounds to punish off-
campus communication.”93 Nevertheless, a student’s intent, by itself, 
may not be enough to satisfy a new test: “schools should not be able to 
use [intent] as an excuse to regulate everything a student says.”94 
However, “students should not be allowed to have free reign to cause 
significant disruptions at school from the privacy of their own homes 
and never suffer any type of consequence.”95 
Therefore, the main questions regarding intent should be: (1) whether 
the student intended for other students at her school to read her blog 
posts off-campus; (2) whether the student intended for her speech to 
reach students both on- and off-campus; and (3) whether the student 
intended for the speech to mean more than an adolescent equivalent of 
blowing off steam. These three issues are suggestions of ways a court 
can analyze a student’s intent behind off-campus speech. Recognizing 
that a statement may be rehearsed and prepared with the assistance of 
counsel, the court should, at the very least, hear and consider a statement 
made by the student whose off-campus speech resulted in an alleged 
First Amendment violation. 
Element 2. Does the Student’s Speech Create a True Threat to the Other 
Students, Teachers, or School Officials? 
A court’s inquiry into whether a school’s restriction on a student’s 
off-campus speech violates the student’s First Amendment Free Speech 
rights should begin with the true threat doctrine once intent is 
considered.96 Applying this doctrine “would ensure students’ threatening 
speech could be proscribed so schools can maintain a safe environment 
for their students and employees.”97 Although the true threat doctrine 
 
 90. Id. at 1236. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 1237. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 1233. 
 97. Id. 
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traditionally applied only to “a serious expression of an intent to commit 
an act of unlawful violence,” the courts can expand it “in the school 
context to include threats of physical violence or harm as well as threats 
to harm a person’s reputation or other threats that are equally damaging 
mentally and emotionally that could be properly characterized as 
cyberbullying.”98 
With the rise in technology, cyberbullying is becoming an ever-
increasing threat to both the physical and mental safety of children.99 
Although bullying may likely be categorized as “more of a nuisance 
than a threat, . . . if a student bullies another student or teacher and that 
communication can be characterized as a threat, the school should be 
able to properly discipline that student without violating his or her free 
speech rights.”100 Thus, if a school could protect bullying that reached 
the level of a true threat due to “damaging speech, students . . . would 
not be entitled to First Amendment protection and would be further 
deterred from taking their bullying from the schoolyard to 
cyberspace.”101  
Element 3. Does the Speech Have Special Educational Qualities? 
The Tinker test “is not automatically implicated” simply “because the 
speaker is a student.”102 In Bell, the Fifth Circuit analyzed the student 
speech from the point of view of the school, rather than from that of the 
student. As stated by Katherine E. Geddes, “[t]he Fifth Circuit’s initial 
starting point misses the mark”103 because the Fifth Circuit analyzed the 
situation from the school’s perspective rather than the student’s 
perspective.104 Thus, the Fifth Circuit improperly applied Tinker to the 
student’s rap lyrics because “Tinker’s holding is expressly grounded in 
the ‘special characteristics of the school environment.’”105 As a result, 
the Fifth Circuit inappropriately applied Tinker to Bell’s rap lyrics “that 
inherently lack[] those special educational qualities.”106 This 
 
 98. Id. at 1234. 
 99. Id. (noting that “[a]ccording to recent statistics, approximately one million students were 
subjected to some form of cyberbullying on Facebook alone in the year 2011” and that “about 20% of 
students claim they have been bullied through the Internet”). 
 100. Id. (noting that “the student in Kowalski created a fake MySpace profile that was extremely 
degrading to a fellow student”). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Katherine E. Geddes, First Amendment—Student Speech—Why Bell Tolls a Review of 
Tinker’s Application to Off-Campus Online Student Speech, 69 SMU L. REV. 275, 280 (2016) 
(hereafter, “Geddes, Bell Tolls a Review”).  
 103. Id. at 279. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 106. Id. 
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misapplication can easily be removed: before restricting a student’s off-
campus speech, the court should positively determine that the 
questionable student speech has “special educational qualities.”107 
To determine whether the speech has “special educational qualities,” 
the court should consider whether (a) the student’s off-campus speech 
(b) in its entirety and in its original context (c) will negatively affect the 
learning process. For example, in Bell, the rap lyrics targeted two 
coaches.108  However, “while one of the coaches said the rap made him 
feel ‘scared,’ the other testified that the song was ‘just a rap,’ nothing to 
be threatened by.”109 This analysis would ensure that the student could 
be reprimanded for harassing, intimidating, or threatening speech, but 
only if the speech hinder the education of other students. Without “an 
analysis of the speech in its entirety” and “[w]ithout including a 
contextual analysis,” courts applying the Fifth Circuit’s holding “will 
likely have broad practical implications because it will regulate 
protected speech, chilling student speech overall.”110 
Thus, schools and courts should only restrict student speech “based 
on the message a speaker conveys”111 in its entirety. A student’s off-
campus speech “may be offensive, perhaps even ‘lewd’ or ‘lascivious,’ 
but that alone should not provide a basis for banning it or sanctioning its 
use.”112 Similar to Justice Marshall Harlan’s comment “one man’s 
vulgarity is another’s lyric . . . [,] one educator’s moment of panic in the 
face of student speech that she disagrees with is another’s opportunity to 
instruct . . . .”113 Courts considering the “special educational qualities” 
of the student’s speech would ensure that educators and school officials 
“use both judgment and reason to help students learn, rather than the 
cudgel of discipline to instill a reflexive rejection of speech (and ideas) 
that fall outside the collective norms.”114 
Element 4. How Many People Had Access to the Student’s Speech; Did 
Anyone Access the Speech from Inside the School? 
Stemming from the “special educational qualities” test, the number of 
 
 107. Id.  
 108. Bell v. Itawamba Cnty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 383 (5th Cir. 2015) (“Bell, a student . . . 
posted a rap recording containing threatening language against two high school teachers/coaches on the 
Internet . . . . ”). 
 109. Geddes, supra note 102, at 280. 
 110. Id. at 280-281. 
 111. Mark R. Killenbeck, Special Remarks on Student Speech: Activities that Require Judgment 
and Reason? 68 ARK. L. REV. 883, 891 (2016) (internal quotation omitted). 
 112. Id. at 893. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
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people who had access and whether the student’s speech was accessed 
from inside the school ultimately pertain to whether schools, and 
therefore courts, can restrict students’ off-campus speech. First, while 
“[i]t is certainly true that some students may be especially immature and 
vulnerable . . . . [,] most students . . . do not shed their brains at the 
schoolhouse gate, and most students know dumb advocacy [and 
inappropriate speech] when the see [and hear] it.”115 By considering the 
total number of students exposed to another’s off-campus speech, school 
officials and courts will better determine whether the student body as a 
whole would consider the off-campus speech as hindering their 
collective education. To consider other solutions and to “[t]reat[] [the 
students] otherwise is an insult to their intelligence and a disservice to 
them, their families, and the communities they will eventually live in 
and serve.”116 
If, in addition to considering how many students accessed the off-
campus speech in total, officials and courts consider how many accessed 
the speech at school, they will be better positioned to determine whether 
the student body as a whole was negatively affected. Specifically, by 
determining the number of students affected, school officials can easily 
turn a moment of offensive vulgarity into a moment of instruction on the 
value of free speech. Furthermore, if the off-campus speech was brought 
onto school grounds, school officials may have more control over how 
to react to the speech. By bringing the off-campus speech onto school 
grounds, the off-campus speech may inadvertently become on-campus 
speech. Therefore, school officials may have more leeway in restricting 
such speech. 
B.  Applying the Proposed Test 
 Recall the scenario presented in this article’s Introduction, where a 
student created a blog, posted harmful comments, and allowed others to 
add their own comments and posts.  
V.  HOW DOES THIS INTERSECT WITH THE PARENTAL RIGHT TO RAISE 
KIDS? 
Kids fall from trees (because they climb them in the first place); they 
eat dirt (an average total of almost six pounds over a person’s life);117 
 
 115. Id. (quoting Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 444 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting)) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Strange Facts—The Average Person Eats 6 Lbs of Dirt in Their Lifetime, 
HealthCareDailyOnline (April 29, 2015), http://www.healthcaredailyonline.com/psychology/strange-
17
Springer: Warning! Speak at Your Own Risk: First Amendment Restrictions on
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018
866 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 86 
and they say adorable things. However, with “the recent trend toward 
‘helicopter parenting’”118and others vehemently opposing it, strangers 
and law enforcement are beginning to believe some parents are 
“exposing their children to unacceptable levels of danger.”119 As a 
result, public entities and individuals other than a child’s parents impose 
their own personal views on child rearing, a sudden breach of a parents’ 
Fourteenth Amendment rights.120 
“At the core of the conflict is the ongoing debate about what 
constitutes responsible parenting in a world increasingly obsessed with 
child safety.”121 As a result of increased media attention on child 
abduction, child abuse, and other potential dangers, parents are ever-
increasingly erring on the side of overprotection.122 Yet, “[t]here is 
mounting evidence that such overprotection does more harm than good, 
but parents . . . who resist the hyper-parenting trend, are running afoul of 
the legal system.”123 Furthermore, “[t]he spate of news items suggests a 
trend toward enhanced, arguably invasive, scrutiny of parents, with the 
state second-guessing the parenting decisions they make, and 
intervening whenever they disagree with the parents’ judgment call.”124 
Although “[t]he intrusions are made in the name of protecting children 
from harm, a public policy objective that is both easy to defend and hard 
to dismiss,” the “disruption of the family in this way—removing or even 
threatening to remove kids from their families—can do tremendous 
harm to children, the very children the state is trying to protect, and in 
many cases contravene the family’s fundamental liberty interests            
. . . .”125 In a similar vein, when a school restricts a student’s off-campus 
speech, parents may argue that the school is now intruding on the 
parental right to discipline and raise children as the parents see fit. 
Consider a situation wherein parents allow their ten-year-old and six-
year-old children to walk from the neighborhood playground back to 
their home; however, on their way home, a stranger calls the police, 
believing the children are in peril.126 The police bring the children home 
 
facts-the-average-person-eats-6-lbs-of-dirt (last visited April 11, 2017). 
 118. David Pimentel, Protecting the Free-Range Kid: Recalibrating Parents’ Rights and the Best 
Interest of the Child, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 3 (2016). 
 119. Id. 
 120. See id. at 19 (“While the Supreme Court has recognized that parents enjoy a fundamental 
liberty interest in their decisions about how to raise their children, those Fourteenth Amendment rights 
are not being adequately protected.”). 
 121. Id. at 3.  
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 4. 
 125. Id. at 5. 
 126. Id. at 1 (“In January 2015, the [] children, ages ten and six, were permitted to do a short walk 
on their own, from the neighborhood playground back to their home in Silver Spring, Maryland. Their 
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and threaten to remove the children from the home.127 Soon thereafter, 
the state commences an abuse and neglect investigation simply because 
the children walked, unsupervised, from a public playground back to 
their home.128 Now compare this situation to the following one: parents 
allow their child to have unrestricted access to a personal laptop, even 
though their original intention was to give their child a computer for 
school use. Thereafter, their child proceeds to post threatening, 
harassing, or intimidating content about others students online. School 
officials hear about the content posted online by the child, proceed to 
expel the child because of the content, and even contact the police 
because the school believes the content rises to the level of violence 
against another child. The parents know nothing of these events until 
they attend the expulsion hearing at the school, and receive a personal 
visit by the police at their home. The police threaten to investigate and 
to proceed with legal action. 
Comparing both the “free-range kids” walking home and the “free-
range kids” posting online, almost all “[p]arents caught in this nightmare 
are well advised to cooperate quickly, apologize profusely, and promise 
it won’t happen again . . . in order to avoid having their children taken 
away from them”129 or to avoid their children receiving a school 
suspension or, worse yet, an expulsion. However, “protecting the rights 
of parents to parent as they see fit—safeguarding their discretion in 
parenting, including issues of risk-management for their children—is 
likely to do far more to advance the interests of the children than the 
emerging pattern of state intervention can hope to achieve.”130 
“Free-range parenting” is applicable to numerous scenarios, including 
the two mentioned above. “Free-range parenting” is described as: 
 
[A] reaction to the present-day obsession with child-safety, and the 
emerging parenting norms that reflect those fears. . . . Preteen 
babysitters, sandlot baseball, bike riding in the neighborhood, and 
tree-climbing, once staples of childhood in America, are now relics 
of history. . . . Free-range parents . . . mourn the loss of freedom 
for today’s kids, and argue that kids are actually far worse off 
because of these ‘safety’ measures. . . . [And] today’s coddled kids 
 
parents designed this exercise to help the children develop some independence and self-sufficiency, and 
did so only after the children had completed other smaller challenges to prepare them for this one. But 
the parenting lesson was quickly disrupted when someone saw the children walking alone and reported 
it to the police.”). 
 127. Id. (“The children were picked up by police, the father was threatened with removal of the 
children from his custody . . . .”). 
 128. Id. (“[T]he State of Maryland commenced an abuse and neglect investigation.”). 
 129. Id. at 5. 
 130. Id. at 6. 
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not only lose a sense of discovery and exploration when they are 
kept home and under nonstop adult supervision, they are deprived 
of an opportunity to develop self-sufficiency and or to learn to take 
responsibility for themselves.131 
 
Parenting is “an exercise in risk management.”132 Allowing kids to walk 
to school, to wait alone at the bus top, “certainly exposes them to some 
risk; but keeping them indoors where they will be ‘safe,’ . . . certainly 
exposes them to a variety of other harms,”133 including restrictions on 
their First Amendment Free Speech rights. “If parents face liability for 
exposing children to risk, they have lost before they begin, because the 
risks cannot be eliminated, only managed . . . .”134  
As mentioned earlier, while “[i]t is certainly true that some students 
may be especially immature and vulnerable . . . [,] [m]ost students . . . 
do not shed their brains at the schoolhouse gate, and most students know 
dumb advocacy [and inappropriate speech] when the see [and hear] 
it.”135 Thus, parents who grant their children unrestricted access to a 
computer do, in fact, expose their children to some risk; however, those 
risks are managed risks, hopefully designed by the parents to teach their 
children self-sufficiency, self-responsibility, and self-control. “In fact, 
there are many approaches to parenting . . . and parents should have a 
right to raise their children in a manner consistent with their means and  
. . . values.”136 However, by imposing a loosey-goosey application of 
Tinker to off-campus speech, school officials and courts are wielding 
terrible power, restricting not only the student’s freedom of speech, but 
the parent’s Fourteenth Amendment right to life and liberty without state 
intervention, and the primary parental “right to raise their children 
according to the dictates of their own consciences,”137 wherein exists a 
“private realm of family life which the state cannot enter.”138 
V.  CONCLUSION 
“[P]arents are empowered in order to protect children’s best 
 
 131. Id. at 7, 9. 
 132. Id. at 11. 
 133. Pimentel, supra note 118, at 11. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Killenbeck, supra note 111, at 893 (quoting Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 444 (2007) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting)) (internal quotations omitted). 
 136. Pimentel, supra note 118, at 18-19. 
 137. Samantha Godwin, Against Parental Rights, 47 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 11 (2015) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
 138. Id. (internal quotations omitted).  
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interests,”139 because “children lack the rationality to make key 
decisions or to care for themselves adequately.”140 As such, “[t]he 
Supreme Court has found that there exists a private realm of family life 
which the state cannot enter.”141 More so, this parental right extends not 
only to the state and other adults, but to the parents’ own children.142 
Therefore, the extent of parent rights extends not only to “how ideal 
parents exercise their power to provide the effective care and guidance 
children need,”143 but also to “[t]he extent to what the law enables 
imperfect parents to do to their children.”144 If courts impose either the 
“reasonably foreseeable” or “nexus” framework, they will inevitably 
restrict the ability of an adult to parent a child through the imposition of 
intensive parenting restrictions because “the system will effectively 
force people to curtail their family size, chilling the exercise of their 
fundamental right to procreate.”145 This is because these restrictive 
“parenting norms [will] lead[] down a road [of] de facto prohibitions on 
large families [because] . . . low-income families cannot afford to level 
of intensive child care that would be required of them.”146 However, the 
courts may avoid all of this by creating a new off-campus First 
Amendment speech test, rather than applying the tests applicable to First 
Amendment on-campus speech.  
By creating a completely new test solely for off-campus speech, 
Tinker and the specific exception created by the Supreme Court would 
still apply to on-campus speech; however, the Supreme Court, and 
courts thereafter, would be able to distinguish between on-campus and 
off-campus speech and how best to handle any restrictions because “on-
campus and off-campus distinction is becoming increasingly difficult 
with the instantaneous nature of the Internet.”147 Furthermore, 
considering whether the student’s off-campus speech has “special 
educational qualities” will ensure that only student speech without those 
special qualities are restricted. Finally, a new test will guarantee that 




 139. Id. at 1. 
 140. Id. at 9-10. 
 141. Id. at 11 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 142. Id. at 17 (“Parents’ right to control nearly every aspect of a child’s life is held not only 
against the state and other adults, but also against their own children.”). 
 143. Id. at 10. 
 144. Id. at 10. 
 145. Pimentel, supra note 118, at 33. 
 146. Id.  
 147. Boyd, supra note 1, at 1236. 
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